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Abstract 
  A key intention of the regulatory reform of transmission charge schemes on Japan’s 
electric power market was to promote inter-regional competition between power suppliers 
by lowering long-distance transmission charges with a postage-stamp charge scheme. This 
can lead to extensive use of inter-regional links and cause congestion. Congestion segments 
the market into several regional markets, making the reform less successful. We developed 
a nine-region spatial equilibrium model to simulate the reform at the peak-load hour. We 
found the reform would lead to significant increases of inter-regional transmission and 
congestion at the link between the 50-Hz area and the 60-Hz area. 
 
JEL Classification: L94, L51, R12, C61 
Keywords: electric power market, regulatory reform, spatial equilibrium model, network 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Background on Regulatory Reforms 
  Japan’s electric power sector has been regionally monopolized by nine (and ten 
from 1972) vertically integrated companies, called general electric utilities (GEU’s). The 
electric power industry used to be considered a natural monopoly because of its subadditive 
cost structure. Regional demand was, in principle, supposed to be met with domestic power 
plants held by GEU's. In other words, the power system was developed for regional autarky. 
Recently, the situation has been reversed. We no longer expect sizeable benefits from scale 
economies in this sector but recognize such a regional autarky system to be less efficient 
than the systems used in the US and Europe due to a lack of competition among incumbents 
and entrants in and across regions. The differences in charges between these countries and 
Japan suggest the magnitude of the inefficiency of the electric power industry in Japan.   
Charges in Japan are higher then other countries by 20–30%. 
  To tackle the inefficiency of the domestic electric power industry, the regulatory 
authority has permitted entrants, called power producers and suppliers (PPS's), to generate 
electricity with their own plants or to retail power to large-scale users. In contrast, the 
authority did not propose deregulation in the transmission nor the distribution sector, in 
which natural monopolies still prevail because of network externalities. The deregulation in    
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the power generation sector cannot work alone because transmission and distribution 
network is possessed and managed by the incumbents. Free access to the network has to be 
accompanied by reasonable charge schemes to ensure competition among GEU's and PPS's 
to abolish the inefficiency of this industry. 
  
1.2  Transmission Charge Schemes 
  A huge amount of investment has been made for development of a nationwide 
transmission network system. Transmission charges are imposed to recover the costs sunk 
into this development. Various transmission charge schemes can be considered. Lump-sum 
charge schemes are the most efficient for recovering such investment, as a conventional 
theory tells us, but can exclude small-scale players from accessing the market. Thus, we 
have used some ad quantum schemes as well as such lump-sum charge schemes. 
  Japan used a zone-based transmission tariff scheme of pancake pricing till the end 
of March in 2005, which charged on the volume and distance of transmission in combination 
with lump-sum charges. Transmission charges were accumulated in accordance with the 
distance of transmission between producers and users (Table 1). This provided less incentive 
for long-distance transmission and discouraged inter-regional competition. The market 
tended to be segmented into several regional markets, which were dominated by GEU’s and    
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had a few fringe players. 
  From a technological viewpoint, the distance does not necessarily matter in electric 
power transmission. A contract between a supplier and its customer does not necessarily 
require physical transmission between them. Instead, the power injected by the supplier can 
be extracted by other users (probably those nearby); the customer can extract power injected 
by other producers. This is a unique feature of electricity, compared with usual commodities, 
and provides no reason to charge for transmission according to its distance. 
 
1.3  The Charge Scheme Reform and Related Concerns 
  To improve competition between all the power producers and suppliers on the 
network, the regulatory authority decided to replace the pancake pricing scheme with a 
postage-stamp one. The postage-stamp scheme charges only on transmission volume but not 
on distance. The charge scheme is more lump-sum fashion and is thus more efficient than 
the pancake pricing scheme. 
  This reform can lead to extensive use of inter-regional transmission links. Such use 
is a potential risk factor for Japan's electric power network because it is popularly 
recognized that the inter-regional transmission links have had low capacity (Figure 1). 
Particularly, the capacity of the link between Tokyo and Chubu is less than 5% of their    
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market sizes. This is because this link is equipped with frequency converters (FC) to connect 
two areas with different frequencies: the 50-Hz area in eastern Japan and the 60-Hz area in 
western Japan. The GEU's were against this reform because they anticipated excessive use 
of these poor inter-regional transmission links, and such use can make the network system 
unmanageable. 
  However, their claim has not yet been found to be valid. Japan has historically 
developed electric power markets on the principle of regional autarky, where regional 
demand has been met mostly with its domestic supply sources. Inter-regional transmission 
has been regarded only as a supplementary source and has been carried out on a small scale. 
Moreover, even if inter-regional transmission is carried out extensively, congestion can be 
managed by various means, such as congestion charges, rationing, competitive bidding on 
transmission options, or a combination of these means. 
  Economists cast concern on the poorness of the inter-regional network from 
another viewpoint. If the inter-regional links have low capacity compared with potential 
transmission demand and congestion follows, the market will be segmented to reduce 
competitive pressure from players in other regions as it was before the transmission charge 
reform. Non-competitive behavior can reduce the efficiency of the market. These concerns 
motivate us to examine whether congestion can really take place under the postage-stamp    
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pricing scheme and determine the locations of any bottlenecks. 
 
1.4 Literature  Review   
  For Japan’s power market, electricity demand functions were estimated in the 
context of Ramsey pricing by Matsukawa et al. (1993). Cost functions were estimated by, 
among others, Shinjo (1994) to evaluate scale economies in this industry. Although they 
provide empirical insights into demand and supply behavior, none of these studies analyzed 
the impact of regulatory reforms of the transmission tariff system. 
  To the best of our knowledge, no research has been made on the possibility of 
congestion of inter-regional links in connection with the transmission charge scheme reform 
in Japan. This lack of study is the reason that, even after the postage-stamp pricing scheme 
was implemented on April 1, 2005, the myth of "a poor inter-regional transmission network 
system in Japan" still seems common. 
 
1.5 Outline 
  The need for an accurate understanding of the possibility of the transmission 
charge scheme reform causing congestion motivated us to carry out a numerical simulation 
analysis of this reform and its impacts on congestion at inter-regional links. We developed    
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an electricity spatial and temporal price and allocation (e-STPA) model based on the work of 
Takayama and Judge (1971). Nine regions are distinguished in this model. Each region is 
represented by a node and is connected to others through inter-regional links. Users are 
located in each region and they extract power from their domestic node via distribution grids. 
Inter-regional links have their own transmission capacity. We can determine to what extent 
the links would be occupied and congested under different transmission charge schemes. 
  The reference point of our simulations is set at a typical hourly peak load in the 
summer of 2002. By simulating this peak-load situation, we can identify potential 
bottlenecks and draw policy implications. Our simulation yielded three important results 
regarding the transmission charge scheme reform toward a postage-stamp charge scheme: 
(1) it would markedly increase uses of inter-regional transmission links by 45.1% in 
comparison with the situation under the original pancake pricing scheme, (2) it would cause 
congestion at the FC-link, and (3) it would finally lead to total welfare gains by 1.3 million 
yen in the peak-load hour. 
  Next, Section 2 explains the details of our e-STPA model. Section 3 presents our 
simulation scenarios and results, followed by the concluding Section 4. 
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2. E-STPA  model 
2.1 Model  Structure 
  Our e-STPA model distinguishes nine regions in Japan, each of which corresponds 
to the jurisdiction of an individual GEU (1: Hokkaido, 2: Tohoku, 3: Tokyo, 4: Chubu, 5: 
Hokuriku, 6: Kansai, 7: Chugoku, 8: Shikoku, and 9: Kyushu)1. The regions are connected 
with each other via nine inter-regional transmission links. In each region, users extract 
power via domestic distribution grids. Two logical links are defined on each physical 
inter-regional link to identify directions of power flow. The topology of the network is 
summarized in Figure 12. 
  Each region has a pair of inverse supply (1) and demand (2) functions, expressed as 
a nonlinear complementarity problem as follows: 
 
* supply function 
                                                       
1 Another region, Okinawa, does exist but because it is isolated from the other nine regions on the 
Japanese mainland.    We do not include it in our analysis. 
2 We omit another link between Hokuriku and Chubu partly because the link has a low capacity and 
partly because transmission can also be carried out between these regions via Kansai.    
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i p   describes the merit order of the power plants located in each 
region.  Electric power generated in the i-th region  i y   is distributed to its own and other 
regions  ∑j j i z , , as Eq. (3) shows. In addition, losses accruing from outbound inter-regional 
transmission  ∑ ≠ Ω
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, ,   are taken into account by applying a quadratic loss function. 
Eq. (4) shows that consumption in the i-th region  i x   cannot exceed total inbound power 
shipped from all the regions  ∑j i j z ,  less  the  accompanying transmission losses 
∑j i j i z , ω . 
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  Exogenous transmission capacity 
up
j i z ,   is given by Eq. (5) for each inter-regional 
link. When there is no more room to transmit via this link, the shadow price of its capacity 
constraint  j i r,   arises. This can be interpreted as congestion charges. The network operator 
might not explicitly impose congestion charges in practice, instead using some other 
schemes, such as rationing, to manage congestion.    In this case, corresponding quasi-rents 
arise with the same magnitude to take the role of congestion charges. 
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  Let us interpret Eq. (6). When transmission from the i-th region to the j-th region 
takes place (i.e.,  0 , > j i z ), the consumer price of electricity in the j-th region 
x
j p   is equal to 
its producer price in the i-th region 
y
i p   with transmission charges  j i t , , congestion charges    
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j i r, , shadow prices of marginal outbound transmission losses 
y
i j i j i p z , , 2Ω , and shadow 
prices of marginal inbound transmission losses 
x
j j p ω . When there is no transmission from 
the i-th region to the j-th region (i.e.,  0 , = j i z ), this inter-regional price linkage does not 
necessarily hold but allows the consumer price 
x
j p   to be lower than the producer price 
y
i p  
plus transmission-related costs and losses. In the case of intra-regional transmission, 
neither outbound transmission losses nor congestion charges are considered. 
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* endogenous variables 
  i y :  production in the i-th region 
  i x :  consumption in the i-th region 
  j i z , :  transmission from the i-th region to the j-th region 
 
y
i p :  producer prices in the i-th region 
 
x
i p :  consumer prices in the i-th region 
  j i r, :  congestion charges at the link from the i-th region to the j-th region 
* exogenous variables/constants 
 
x
i A :  constant terms of demand function in the i-th region 
 
x
i B :  slope parameters of demand function in the i-th region 
  j i t , :  transmission charges from the i-th region to the j-th region 
  j i, Ω :  marginal inter-regional outbound loss transmission parameters 
  i ω :  marginal inbound transmission loss parameters 
 
up
j i z , :  transmission capacity of the link from the i-th region to the j-th region 
 
  The inter-regional relationships can be graphically confirmed in Figure 2. The gap 
between domestic production  i y  and  consumption  i x   corresponds to the amount of 
exporting transmission to the other region of j,  j i z , . This must be equal to the importing    
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transmission in the other region, which also corresponds to the gap between its production 
j y  and  consumption  j x . The producer price 
y
i p   plus transportation charges  j i t ,  are 
exactly equal to the consumer price in the other region 
x
j p  because  inter-regional 
transmission takes place (i.e.,  0 , > j i z ) in this figure (omitting transmission losses and 
congestion). The consumer price 
x
j p   is also equal to its domestic producer price 
y
j p  plus 
its domestic transmission cost  j j t , . This inter-price linkage ensures that domestic 
producers can be as competitive as foreign producers. 
 
2.2 Model  Calibration 
  We developed supply functions (1) on the basis of merit-order curves considering all 
the thermal plants of the GEU's and large-scale wholesalers, while assuming nuclear plants 
and thermal plants of PPS's are low-cost must-run plants. We assume that the operation 
rate of non-pumping plants is 50% of their available capacity and that these plants are also 
must-run ones3. The capacity of the pumping plants and the remaining capacity of the 
non-pumping ones are supposed to generate reactive power to maintain the network, not to 
be consumed by any users. The reference load is set at the three-day average hourly peak 
                                                       
3  The available capacity takes seasonality of river water and rain fall for plant operation into account.    
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load in each region.   
  Price elasticity in the demand function (2) is econometrically estimated for each 
region and converted into slope parameters at the annual mean load in each region. 
Intercept terms are calibrated to the peak load4. Outbound transmission loss parameters 
j i, Ω   are calibrated to an average occupation rate of transmission links (19%) and the loss 
rate (2%), assuming the quadratic transmission loss function (3). Inbound transmission loss 
rates  i ω   are set at a constant rate of 2%. 
 
3. Simulation 
3.1  Simulation Scenarios and Base Run 
  The pancake pricing scheme shown in Table 1 was replaced with the postage-stamp 
scheme in 2005. Under the postage-stamp charge scheme, transmission tariffs are 
determined considering the place of demand, but not that of supply or transmission distance. 
The charge reform can bring more or less earnings than the pancake pricing scheme and 
could lead to revenue gaps for the network operator. We take the revenue gap into account 
only when considering welfare in a lump-sum manner. 
                                                       
4  The price elasticity is reported in Appendix I with results of its econometric diagnostics tests.    
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  The base run solution is shown in Figure 3. In western Japan, which is a 60-Hz 
frequency area consisting of Chubu, Kansai, Hokuriku, Shikoku, Chugoku, and Kyushu, the 
link from Shikoku to Kansai experiences a high occupation rate (93.6%). In eastern Japan, 
which is a 50-Hz frequency area consisting of Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Tokyo, heavy 
transmission from Tohoku to Tokyo appears to cause congestion. Other links generally show 
low occupancy. 
  Due to the frequency converter between Tokyo and Chubu, high transmission 
charges are imposed (Table 1). This leads to the amount of transmission between the 
western and eastern areas being quite small (only 8.7% of transmission capacity) even 
though the producer price in Chubu is significantly lower than that in Tokyo by 2.13 
yen/kWh. 
  The total inter-regional transmission amounts to 13,490 MW, which is only 7.8% of 
the total power generation. No congestion is caused by this inter-regional transmission 
except at the Tohoku-Tokyo link, which is true to the prediction based on the regional 
autarky system. As a whole, the base run generally shows results consistent with our 
common knowledge about inter-regional transmission patterns. Our counter-factual 
simulation was carried out on the basis of this base run solution. 
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3.2  Reform for Postage-stamp Pricing Scheme 
  In the counter-factual run, the pancake style transmission charges shown in Table 
1 (1.19–7.39 yen/kWh) were replaced with postage-stamp charges. Charges for long-distance 
transmission were lowered to stimulate inter-regional transmission (Figure 4). The total 
amount of inter-regional transmission would amount to 19,574 MW, which is 45.1% more 
than that in the base run. 
  In the western area, Kansai would intensify its imports from other regions, 
particularly from Kyushu and Shikoku. Kansai would consume half of this imported power 
and re-export the other half to Chubu. Chubu would again re-export 40% of its imports to 
Tokyo via the FC-link. Notably, inter-regional transmission would not hit transmission 
capacity ceilings in the western area but would do so at the FC-link. The congestion would 
cause a price gap of 1.61 yen/kWh between Tokyo and Chubu. This price gap consists of 
congestion charges (0.28 yen/kWh) as well as imputed charges of transmission losses (1.33 
yen/kWh). However, the gap would be smaller than that in the base run. 
  In the eastern area, inter-regional transmission would increase marginally because 
the Tohoku-Tokyo link was already congested in the base run and thus had no room to 
transmit power to Tokyo. Finally, transmission patterns in the east would not differ 
significantly.    
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  Generally, imports and exports let domestic consumers and producers access lower 
consumer and higher producer prices to increase their surpluses. Consumers in Tohoku, 
Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai would gain along with the gains of producers in Hokkaido, 
Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu. The overall welfare in Japan would increase by 1.3 million 
yen in the peak-load hour we considered. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
  By simulating transmission patterns under two different transmission charge 
schemes, we found that no serious congestion would take place under the postage-stamp 
pricing scheme at any links in western Japan. Its abundant transmission capacity could 
allow further deregulation, which presupposes inter-regional competition. However, the 
FC-link and the Tohoku-Tokyo link would experience congestion at the peak-load hour. 
Congestion at these two links to Tokyo could provide an opportunity for its domestic power 
companies to exercise monopolistic power in the peak-load hour. We therefore need to keep a 
special watch on their possible non-competitive behavior. 
  Our simulation was for a typical peak load. The regional load is much lighter at 
other times, but patterns of inter-regional power flow are uncertain. Between regions, 
regional power companies are equipped with technologically similar natural gas- and    
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oil-fired thermal plants for their peak-load times. As far as we focus on peak-load times, 
their marginal costs are thus similar. In contrast, capacity of cheap plants such as nuclear 
and coal-fired thermal ones considerably vary by region. Depending on domestic load size, 
marginal plants and costs vary widely between regions. Accordingly, inter-regional 
transmission patterns are dynamically different. Our simulations have to be extended to 
cover the off-peak times, during both the day and the night. After covering all of the 
situations and summing up the welfare changes in all of them for a year, we will finally be 
able to evaluate the overall costs and benefits of the regulatory reform in transmission 
charge schemes. 
  Our simulations do not consider any uncertainty or the impacts of uncertainty on 
inter-regional transmission patterns. As network operators worry, unscheduled shutdown of 
large-scale nuclear plants ––– which actually took place in 2004 ––– can be critical for power 
markets. Under the regional autarky regime, each GEU used to be responsible for meeting 
demand in its domain. This responsibility can now be shared by all the power producers 
integrated with inter-regional transmission. By simulating sudden shocks to demand and 
supply, we can evaluate the robustness of the network under such uncertainty.    
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Appendix I: Estimation of Demand Price Elasticity 
  We estimate the following demand function for regions of i : 
  () ( ) ( )( ) i i i i i i i i i p DAY Poil GDP Q log log log log ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ε δ γ β α , 
where  i Q   is the index of power demand excluding lighting service,  i GDP  is real gross 
regional product,  Poil   is the wholesale price index of heavy oil, which is common across 
regions,  i DAY   is sum of the summer days and the winter days, and  i p   is the index of 
regional power price. Price elasticity  i ε   is estimated for each region i and used to calibrate 
the demand function (2). 
  Durbin-Watson statistics indicate a serial correlation in residuals in plain ordinary 
panel estimates. To correct a serial correlation in the error term, we use the generalized 
method of moments (GMM). A test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen (1982)) cannot be 
rejected at conventional significance level. All of our estimates of price elasticity and the 
others are statistically significant and theoretically reasonable (Table A).    
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Table A: Estimation Results (Dependent Variable: 
i Q ) 
Regions Constant  i GDP   i Poil   i DAY   i p   Adjusted R2 
-2.5379  0.6144 0.3165 0.0461 -0.4547  0.990 
Hokkaido 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.192] [.000]  
-4.4147  0.6945 0.2879 0.1074 -0.4034  0.990 
Tohoku 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.001]    [.000]  
-6.0157  0.7109 0.1988 0.1070 -0.2370  0.995 
Tokyo 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.000]  
-3.6418  0.6261 0.1556 0.0771 -0.2722  0.993 
Chubu 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.034] [.000]  
-0.0728  0.4532 0.1062 0.0572 -0.3111  0.978 
Hokuriku 
[.788] [.000] [.000] [.059] [.000]  
-3.6826  0.5617 0.1409 0.1436 -0.1595  0.990 
Kansai 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.002] [.006]  
-1.5248  0.5042 0.2639 0.0915 -0.4176  0.950 
Chugoku 
[.014] [.000] [.000] [.272] [.000]  
-0.6365  0.4603 0.2846 0.1145 -0.4575  0.972 
Shikoku 
[.076] [.000] [.000] [.016] [.000]  
-5.2881  0.7455 0.2634 0.1302 -0.3606  0.990 
Kyushu 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.030] [.000]  
Note: P-values are in brackets. 
 
Data Sources 
(1) Electric power quantity, capacity, revenues, and costs   
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), Denryoku-Jyukyu-no-Gaiyou [Abstract of 
the Electric Power Demand and Supply].    
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The Federation of Electric Power Companies, Denki-Jigyou-Binran [Handbook of the 
Electric Power Industry]. 
 
(2) Prefectural economic data 
Asahi Newspaper, Minryoku [National Power]. 
Bank of Japan, Bukka-Shisu-Geppo [Price Indexes Monthly], Research and Statistics 
Department. 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts, Cabinet 
Office. 
National Astronomical Observatory, Rika-Nempyo [Chronological Scientific Tables], 
Maruzen.  
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Table 1: Transmission Charges under Pancake Pricing Scheme (yen/kWh) 
From/To Hokkaido  Tohoku  Tokyo  Chubu  Hokuriku Kansai  Chugoku  Shikoku  Kyushu 
Hokkaido  1.50 3.36 3.90 5.91 6.09 5.94 6.16 6.88 6.57 
Tohoku  3.55  1.41 1.95 3.96 4.14 3.99 4.21 4.93 4.62 
Tokyo  3.84 1.70 1.53 3.54 3.72 3.57 3.79 4.51 4.20 
Chubu  5.85 3.71 3.54 1.59 1.77 1.62 1.84 2.56 2.25 
Hokuriku  6.37 4.23 4.06 2.11 1.23 1.60 1.82 2.54 2.23 
Kansai  6.15 4.01 3.84 1.89 1.53 1.38 1.60 2.32 2.01 
Chugoku  6.53 4.39 4.22 2.27 1.91 1.76 1.30 2.41 1.71 
Shikoku  7.39 5.25 5.08 3.13 2.77 2.62 2.47 1.19 2.88 
Kyushu  6.84 4.70 4.53 2.58 2.22 2.07 1.61 2.72 1.33 
Source: Wheeling and access charges as of April 2004 compiled by the authors. 
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Source: CEPC (2002)  
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Figure 2: The e-STPA Model ––– A Two-region Case ––– 
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Note: Transmission losses and capacity constraints are omitted for simplicity of the figure.  
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Figure 3: Base Run under Pancake Pricing Scheme 
Production 4,274 -
Consumption 3,933 -
Prod. Price 3.67 -
Cons. Price 5.28 -
Production (MW) 172,133 - Welfare 0.35 -
Consumption (MW) 167,807 - Prod. Surp. 0.14 -
Transmission Losses (MW) 4,325 - Cons. Surp. 0.21 -
(MW) 13,490 -
Welfare 37.04 - Production 6,228 -
Producer Surplus 7.30 - Transmission 949 Consumption 5,157 - Transmission 250










(100 mil. yen) Network. Op. Surplus 0.00 - Loss Rate (3.6) Cons. Price 6.81 - Loss Rate (8.8)
Tran. Charge Rev. 2.62 - Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 0.60 - Cong. Charg. 0.00
Netwk. Fixed Cost 2.62 Prod. Surp. 0.26 -
Cons. Surp. 0.34 -
Production 29,227 - Transmission 1,540 Production 18,893 -
Transmission 1,953 Consumption 31,218 - Occup. Rate (27.6) Consumption 12,261 -








Loss Rate (2.5) Cons. Price 7.39 - Cong. Charg. 0.00 Cons. Price 7.50 -
→ →
Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 10.89 - Welfare 1.35 -
Prod. Surp. 1.03 - Prod. Surp. 0.72 -
Cons. Surp. 9.86 - Cons. Surp. 0.63 -
Production 11,942 - Production 25,323 -
Transmission 444 Consumption 11,121 - Transmission 1,310 Consumption 26,222 - Transmission 6,000







Loss Rate (1.7) Cons. Price 6.78 - Loss Rate (19.7) Cons. Price 8.26 - Loss Rate (21.1)
Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 1.54 - Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 5.66 - Cong. Charg. 1.02
Prod. Surp. 0.39 - Prod. Surp. 0.89 -




Tokyo Kyushu Shikoku →
←
Production 16,364 - Production 7,306 - Production 52,577 -
Consumption 15,598 - Transmission 940 Consumption 4,791 - Transmission 104 Consumption 57,507 -
Prod. Price 4.96 - Occup. Rate (39.2) Prod. Price 3.86 - Occup. Rate (8.7) Prod. Price 8.63 -
Cons. Price 6.41 - Loss Rate (8.2) Cons. Price 5.15 - Loss Rate (1.8) Cons. Price 10.37 -
Welfare 1.58 - Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 0.41 - Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 14.66 -
Prod. Surp. 0.55 - Prod. Surp. 0.21 - Prod. Surp. 3.11 -
Cons. Surp. 1.03 - Cons. Surp. 0.20 - Cons. Surp. 11.55 -
→
Tokyo Kyushu Shikoku ←
 
Unit: Price and congestion charges are in yen/kWh. Numbers in parentheses are percentages.  
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Figure 4: Counter-factual Run under Postage-stamp Pricing Scheme 
Production 4,275 (0.0)  
Consumption 3,548 (-9.8)  
Prod. Price 4.69 (27.8)  
Cons. Price 6.32 (19.7)  
Production (MW) 173,068 (0.5)    Welfare 0.35 0.005  
Consumption (MW) 168,294 (0.3)    Prod. Surp. 0.18 0.044  
Transmission Losses (MW) 4,774 (10.4)    Cons. Surp. 0.17 -0.039  
(MW) 19,574 (45.1)   
Welfare 37.06 0.013    Production 6,228 (0.0)  
Producer Surplus 6.90 -0.396    Transmission 959 Consumption 5,146 (-0.2)   Transmission 593










(100 mil. yen) Network. Op. Surplus -0.06 -0.061    Loss Rate (3.6) Cons. Price 6.84 (0.4)   Loss Rate (20.8)
Tran. Charge Rev. 2.56 -0.061    Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 0.60 0.000   Cong. Charg. 0.00
Netwk. Fixed Cost 2.62 Prod. Surp. 0.26 0.002  
Cons. Surp. 0.34 -0.001  
Production 29,227 (-0.0)   Transmission 2,916 Production 18,893 (-0.0)  
Transmission 3,614 Consumption 31,314 (0.3)   Occup. Rate (52.4) Consumption 12,597 (2.7)  








Loss Rate (4.6) Cons. Price 7.19 (-2.6)   Cong. Charg. 0.00 Cons. Price 7.22 (-3.8)  
→ →
Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 10.90 0.005   Welfare 1.34 -0.017  
Prod. Surp. 0.98 -0.056   Prod. Surp. 0.67 -0.052  
Cons. Surp. 9.92 0.061   Cons. Surp. 0.67 0.035  
Production 11,942 (0.0)   Production 25,322 (-0.0)
Transmission 1,544 Consumption 11,080 (-0.4)   Transmission 1,229 Consumption 26,374 (0.6) Transmission 6,000







Loss Rate (5.8) Cons. Price 6.86 (1.1)   Loss Rate (18.5) Cons. Price 8.05 (-2.6) Loss Rate (21.1)
Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 1.54 0.000   Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 5.67 0.003 Cong. Charg. 1.04
Prod. Surp. 0.40 0.009   Prod. Surp. 0.83 -0.052




Tokyo Kyushu Shikoku →
←
Production 17,299 (5.7)   Production 7,307 (0.0)   Production 52,576 (-0.0)  
Consumption 15,395 (-1.3)   Transmission 1,517 Consumption 4,259 (-11.1)   Transmission 1,200 Consumption 58,580 (1.9)  
Prod. Price 5.12 (3.4)   Occup. Rate (63.2) Prod. Price 4.79 (24.0)   Occup. Rate (100.0) Prod. Price 7.90 (-8.5)  
Cons. Price 6.58 (2.7)   Loss Rate (13.3) Cons. Price 6.10 (18.3)   Loss Rate (21.1) Cons. Price 9.62 (-7.2)  
Welfare 1.58 0.003   Cong. Charg. 0.00 Welfare 0.44 0.025   Cong. Charg. 0.28 Welfare 14.71 0.049  
Prod. Surp. 0.58 0.030   Prod. Surp. 0.28 0.068   Prod. Surp. 2.72 -0.386  
Cons. Surp. 1.00 -0.026   Cons. Surp. 0.16 -0.043   Cons. Surp. 11.99 0.435  
→
Tokyo Kyushu Shikoku ←
 
Unit: Price and congestion charges are in yen/kWh. Numbers in parentheses are percentages. Second columns show changes from the Base 
Run. 
 